PROGRESS OF THE LAW.
As MARKED By DECISIONS SELECTED FROM THE ADVANCE
REPORTS.

ACCORD AND SATISFACTION.
The Superior Court of Pennsylvania decides in Scok v.
Crowz,
33 Pa. Super. Ct., 612 that where an attorney at
Payment:
law collects a claim for a client, and there is
Attorney-at
L.w
no dispute as to the amount collected, but the
attorney arbitrarily fixes the amount of his fee, and gives
a check to his client, which recites payment in full, the client
may accept and use the check as payment on account, and
sue for the balance which he claims that the attorney
wrongfully withholds from him. Compare Washington
A\atinal Gas Co. v. Johnson, 123 Pa. 576.
BANKRUPTCY.
An important holding of the United States Circuit Court
of Appeals of the Seventh Circuit appears in Wilson v.
Brock & Rankin, 154 Fed. 343, where it is held
Liens;
Distress
that the Bankruptcy Act of 1898 providing that
liens obtained through legal proceedings within four months
prior to bankruptcy shall be dissolved by the bankruptcy
proceedings, relate only to those actions or proceedings
taken by creditors who, having no existing lien or right
of lien resting in existing contract entered into in good
faith, seek to obtain a preference by being first in the race
of diligence, and such provisions do not affect a lien obtained
by a landlord by the levy of -a distress warrant for past
due rent under a lease giving the landlord a right of lien
and to distrain for rent in arrears, which was entered into
in good faith and not in contemplation of bankruptcy; such
lien being one which is preserved by section 67d.
568
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CARRIERS.

The United States Circuit Court of Appeals, Sixth Circuit, decides in Clough v. Grand Trunk Western Ry. Co.,
Carrier and

155 Fed., 8, that where a carrier leased motive

power, the use of its tracks, and train operatives
to a circus company, under contract exempting
the carrier from liability for all injuries, the relation of passenger and carrier did not exist between the railroad company and an employe of the circus company, travelling
solely by virtue of his employment, who was not a party to
such transportation contract, so as to entitle such employe
to recover against the railroad company for injuries sustained in a collision between two sections of the circus train.
See also note to Chamberlain v. Pierson, 31 C. C. A., 164.
Passenger:

Relation

It is decided by the Supreme Court of Georgia in Baldwin
v. SeaboardAir Line Ry. Co., 58 S. E. 35, that a passenger
on a railway train who had paid his fare to a
Expulsion of
Passenger

given city, which was under quarantine regu-

lations, and who, when near the end of his journey left the
train at a station on the railway line, in obedience to the
order of a quarantine or health officer, who told him that
he would not be allowed to ride on th9 train into the city,
but must leave it at that station, has no cause of action
against the railway company for a wrongful expulsion from
its train, although the conductor pointed him out to the
health officer, and, after knowledge of such officer's order
to the passenger, did not interfere to prevent its execution.
The Supreme Court of Oklahoma holds in St. Louis &
S. F. R. Co. v. McGivney, 91 Pac. 963, that if freight
Liability of

addressed to a place beyond the usual route of

First
Carrier

the common carrier who first received it is
lost or injured, the shipper may demand satis-

factory information from the first carrier that the injury
or loss, did not occur on its line, and if such carrier fails
to furnish within a reasonable time the proof, in its possession or under its control, tending to show that it was not
responsible for the injury or 'loss, it will be held liable
therefor, regardless of whether or not it was in fact re-
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CARRIERS (Continued).

sponsible for such injury or loss. Compare Farmington
Mercantile Co. v. Chicago B. & Q. R. Co., 166 Mass., 1.54.
In Donlon Bros. v. Southern Pac. Co., 91 Pac. 603, the
Supreme Court of California decides that the court, in
Limiting
determining whether a contract of carriage,
Liability
which stipulates that the carrier shall not be
liable for any damage not caused by its gross negligence,
and that the amount of recovery shall be adjusted on the
basis of value not exceeding the declared value, based on a
consideration of a rate of transportation lower than the
rate otherwise would have been, is not in conflict with a
statutory provision that a carrier cannot be exonerated from
liability for gross negligence, and the contract, if freely
made, limits the recovery for damages resulting from gross
negligence. One judge dissents. Compare Calderon v.
Atlas S. S. Co., 69 Fed. 574In Danciger et al. v. Wells, Fargo & Co., 154 Fed. 380
the United States Circuit Court, W. D. Mo. W. D., decides
C.0. D.
that there is no common-law duty resting upon
Shipment
an express company to act as collection agent
of the shipper and require payment for the goods as a
condition of their delivery; but such obligation, if assumed,
arises only from an independent contract, express or implied,
which the company is at liberty to refuse to make in any
particular case, notwithstanding any usage or custom it
may have established or followed, which cannot enlarge its
legal duty as a carrier Compare McNichol v. Pac.Express
Co. 12 Mo. App. 4Ol.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW.

It is frequently a question of difficulty how far a Legislature can act so as to bind a subsequent Legislature: in
other words to what extent a corporation can
bseqiuent
avil1 itself of the prohibitibn against the imatures pairment of the obligation of contracts
where
its grants or privileges depend upon the gift of the Legislature. One phase of this interesting question appears in
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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (Continued).

Commonwealth v. Broad Street Rapid Transit Railway Co.,
219 Pa., ii, where it is decided that a Legislature cannot

grant away the State's right of eminent domain so as to
bind future Legislatures. In this connection see Metropoli-

tan City Ry. Co. v. Chicago West Division Ry. Co., 87 Ill,
317 •

CORPORATIONS.

An important decision with respect to compliance with
state statutes before foreign corporations are permitted to
do business therein appears in Pittsburg Const.
Foreign
Corporations; Co. v. West Side Belt R. Co. et al., 154 Fed.,
929, where the United States Circuit Court of
Business
Appeals, Third Circuit, decides that under the Pennsylvania
Act of April 22, 1874 (P. L. io8), which provides that it
shall be unlawful fok a foreign corporation to do any
business in the state until it shall have registered and complied with certain other requirements to bring it within
the jurisdiction of the courts in the state, and also makes
it a criminal offense for any officer or agent to transact any
business within the state for a foreign corporation which
has not complied with its requirements, a contract entered
into in Pennsylvania by a foreign corporation which had
not at the time complied with the statute to construct a
railroad within the state is illegal and void, and no action
can be maintained thereon, either against the other party
or a guarantor to recover the contract price of work done
thereunder, although the corporation complied with the
statute prior to the doing of the work. The general principle is stated to be that whether an action is grounded upon
an illegal contract depends upon whether proof of such
contract is necessary to establish the cause of action alleged.
If so, the court will not enforce it nor any alleged rights
arising out of it. See in this connection notes to Wagner v.
J. & G. Meakin, 33 C. C. A., 585; and Ammons v. Brunszcick-Balke Collender Co., 72 C. C. A. 622.
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CORPORATIONS (Continued).

The Supreme Court of Alabama decides in Central Land
Co. et al. v. Sullivan, 44 So. 644, that on a bill by a stockholder to distribute a corporation's assets, averProceeding
to DIssolve
ments that no meeting had been held within
five years, that no officer or agent resided in the state, and
that the business for which the corporation was organized
had never been attempted, sufficiently show an abandonment
of their duties.
A very important decision is handed down by the Court
of Chancery of New York in Colgate et al. v. United States
Leather Co. et al., 67 Atl. 657 where it is held

that one purchasing stock for a corporation
organized for a specified period, cannot object to its subsequent exercise, in a legal manner, of the power' to consolidate with another corporation, where the power existed at
the time of the purchase but was conferred subsequent to
its organization, but the right to object to the consolidation
belongs only to the persons who were shareholders to consolidate was given. The case is very carefully considered
and will no doubt prove an important authority in corporation law. It is worthy of special study. See in this connection Sparrow v. E. & C. R. R. Co. 7 Ind., 369.
CRIMINAL LAW.

In People v. Grill, 91 Pac. 515, the Supreme Court of
California decides that where the accused after having been
Former
convicted of murder in the first degree and senConviction :
Effect
tenced to life imprisonment was granted a new
trial, on his application, at which he was again convicted of
the same offense, his former conviction and sentence was no
bar to a sentence of death on the second conviction. Compare People v. Gordon, 99 Cal. 232.
DISCOVERY.

The Supreme Court of New Hampshire decides in Hub
Const. Co. v. New England Breeders' Club et al., 67 Atl.
Inspection of
574 that a creditor of a corporation being
CorporaIon
BooPr
absolutely entitled to inspect books and records
of the corporation relating to his claim, it was no answer to
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DISCOVERY (Continued).

his exercise of such right that the docurnents sought to be
inspected in themselves might not be admissible in evidence
in a proceeding to enforce his claim.
DISTRICT OF COLUMIA.

The United States Circuit Court, S. D. New York,
decides in Lyons v. Bank of Discount of City of New York,
154 Fed. 391, that the power given to Congress
Leglstative
PowKr of
by the Constitution, to legislate for the District
CongrettS
of Columbia, is not given to it as a local legislature, but as the legislature of the United States, and laws
enacted under such power are laws of the United States,
and enforceable as such throughout the Union. Coinpare
Horner v. United States, 147 U. S. 449.
EMINENT DOMAIN.

In Portland & Seattle Ry. Co. v. Ladd et al., 91 Pac.
573 the Supreme Court of Washington decides that where,
Coinpetsatkn: in a proceeding to condemn land for a railroad
esure
right of way, defendants claimed injury to a
quarry, and it appeared that the rock could not be quarried
without injury to lands which defendants did not own, but
which belonged to the railroad company, the court properly
charged that, if the rock could only be profitably quarried
without injury to the land owned by the railroad company,
the jury should disregard all evidence of the value of the
rock as a quarry. One judge dissents. Compare the very
recent case of In re MantorvilleRy. & Transfer Co., 112 N.
W. 1033.
EQUITY.

An important rule of equity pleading in connection
with recent railway rate legislation appears in St. Louis &
S. F. R. Co. v. Hadley, 155 Fed., 220, where
Pleading:
Supplemental the United States Circuit Court, W. D. MisBill
souri, decides that where suits by railroad companies to restrain the enforcement of a state statute fixing
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freight rates, on the ground that it was confiscatory and
unconstitutional, were pending in a federal court at the
time of the enactment of a second statute fixing passenger
rates, the question of the constitutionality of the second act
may properly be raised and determined in the pending suits
on supplemental bills.

FOREIGN CORPORATIONS.
In British-American Mortgage Co. v. Jones, 58 S. E.,
417, the Supreme Court of South Carolina decides that a

foreign corporation, whose business it is to loan
Doing
Business
money on real estate mortgages, does business
in the State when it pays in New York a draft attached to a
note and mortgage executed in South Carolina on lands in
the state on application forwarded by resident borrower.
Herewith compare Chatanooga National B. & L. Ass'n. v.
Denson, 189 U. S. 408.

INJUNCTIONS.

A very important case with respect to the limits within
which Courts will act to restrain the use or communication
of trade secrets appears in Vulcan Detinning Co.
Trade
Secrets
v. American Can Co. et al., 67 Atl. 339. The
facts were as follows: The complainant purchased from a
concern in Holland a process for the successful detinning of
tin scrap which was unknown in this country, the secret of
which was zealously guarded. After the success of the
process had been demonstrated, one of the complainant's
original directors, charged as such with the duty of secrecy,
and who, held in individual trust for the complainant a copy
of the formula of its process, became the president of the
defendant corporation, and with the assistance of certain
discharged employes of the complainant installed for the
defendant corporation as a competitor of the complainant
the process so purchased by the latter. Upon a bill flied to
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INJUNCTIONS (Continued).

enjoin this competition and to restrain the further publication of the complainant's process-it is held. (a) That the
quondam director of the complainant should be enjoined
because of his breach of trust. (b) That the defendant
corporation should be enjoined, because the knowledge of
its president was imputable to it. (c) That the discharged
employes of the complainant should be enjoined. See Stone
v. Goss, 65 N. J. Eq. 756, 63 L. R. A. 344.

The United States Circuit Court, E. D. Pennsylvania,
decides in Von Thodorovich v. FranzJosef Beneficial Ass'ii,
154 Fed. 911, that the right of the Emperor of
personal
Rights
Austria-Hungary to restrain a beneficial association, doing business in the United States, from using his
name and portrait in advertising its business, because such
use is offensive to the Emperor, is personal to him, and cannot be availed of in a suit in the federal court for such relief
by the imperial and royal consul of such country residing in
the United States. See in this connection The Anne, 3
Wheat. 435.

JUDGMENT

The Supreme Court of South Carolina holds in Kirven v.
Virginia-CarolinaChetm. Co., 58 S. E. 424 that a judgment
in the United States court on a note for fertilRes
Judeata
izers is not res judicata in an action in a state
court for damages to defendant's crops, caused by the use
of such fertilizer, where the same question was raised in the
United States court, but was withdrawn by consent of the
court. The general rule being laid down to be that under
the rulings of the United States Supreme Court, a judgment is not res judicata in a second action on a different
cause of action, unless the question was actually litigated in
the original action. Two judges dissent. See in this connection Cromwell v. Sac County, 94 U. S., 351.
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LOTTERIES.

In Waite v. Press Pub. Ass'n., 155 Fed. 58, the United
States Circuit Court of Appeals, Sixth Circuit, decides that
Contest:
Validity

a guessing contest prior to the presidential
election of November, 19o4, by which defendant agreed to give $io,ooo to the person
who

would make the nearest correct estimate of the total popular
vote to be cast for the office of President of the United
States, on November 8, 19o4, and $5,000 for the second

nearest correct estimate, persons filing guesses being required to pay small sums as a subscription to a periodical
named in the advertisement, constituted a lottery in violation of the federal laws and also of a State statute, providing
that every person who shall set up or promote within the
state any lottery or gift enterprise for money, or shall dispose
of any property, real or personal, goods, chattels, or merchandise, or any valuable thing, by way of lottery or gift
enterprise, shall be punished, &c. See also note to MacDonald v. United States, 12 C. C. A., 346.

MASTER AND SERVANT.

The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania decides in Corgan
v. George F. Lee Coal Co., 219 Pa., 386 that where a person
is employed by a mining company as foreman
Disissal of
Servant
" for so long a time up to five years that he
satisfactorily performs his duties as foreman," the company
has the absolute right, whenever it becomes in good faith
dissatisfied with the services of the foreman, to discharge
him; and if the company discharges him for a cause assigned
and not sufficient, and it appears that at the time the company
had the right to discharge him for another cause, such discharge will not be unlawful because a wrong reason had been
given for it. It is further held that the master is not bound
to givo any reason for the dismissal at. the time, and if he
does, he is not hereby estopped from setting up any other,
or different cause, which really existed when the servant
was discharged. Compare Koehler v. Buhl, 94 Mich. 496.
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MORTGAGES.

The Supreme Court of California decides in Cory v. Santa
Ynez Land & Imp. Co. et al., 91 Pac. 647, that where a
1o10atze in mortgagor places the mortgagee in possession
po...'essp

of mortgaged premises as additional security,

the mortgagee thereby acquires the right to retain possession as long as the secured debt is unpaid, though foreclosure be barred by limitations. Compare Spect v. Spect,
88 Cal., 440, 13 L. R. A., 137.
RAILROADS.

In Durden et al. v. Southern Ry. Co., 58 S. E. 299 the
Court of Appeals of Georgia holds that in the absence of
charter limitations, contractual obligations,
Shipping
Facilities
rule of the railroad commission, or statutory
enactment to the contrary, a railway company may exercise
its discretion in removing a side track or spur at which it
has been accustomed to receive and deliver freights as a
common carrier. Compare N. Pac. R. Co. v. Washington
Territory, 142 U. S. 492.
RECEIVERS.

In Spence v. Solomons Co. et al., 58 S. E. 463, the
Supreme Court of Georgia decides that where money is held
Fund in
by a receiver in a court of equity, which by deReceiver's
Hands
cree is payable to the plaintiff, it is erroneous for
the chancellor, upon application of a general creditor of such
plaintiff who has no lien by judgment or otherwise, nor
any interest in the fund, either legal or equitable, to order
the same held by the receiver until such creditor can institute and prosecute a suit for the recovery of a judgment.
Compare Peyton v. Lamar, 42 Ga., 131.
RELIGIOUS SOCIETIES.

An interesting case very carefully and thoroughly considered and dealing with the differences between the
branches of the Prebyterian Church appears in
Ecclesiastical
Mack et al. v. Kime et al., 58 S. E., 184 where
Tribunals
the Supreme Court of Georgia holds that a
voluntary religious society, which constitutes a subordinate
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RELIGIOUS SOCIETIES (Continued).

part of a religious organization having established tribunals
authorized, either expressly or impliedly to decide all questions of faith, discipline, rule, or ecclesiastical government,
is bound by the decisions of all such tribunals on all questions
determined by them within the respective jurisdictions of
each. In such cases, where a right of property asserted in
a civil court is dependent on a question of doctrine, discipline, ecclesiastical law, rule, custom, or church government,
and that question has been decided by the highest tribunal
within the organization, to which it has been regularly and
properly carried, the civil courts will accept that decision as
conclusive, and be governed by it in its application to the
case before it.
STATUTE OF FRAUDS.

In Stewart et al. v. Smith et al., 91 Pac. 667, the California Court of Appeals, of the Third District, decides that
a contract by which testatrix, in consideration
Contract
to Will
of a transfer of certain property to her by her
children, agreed to make a will, leaving at her death the
whole of the property or residue thereof and all increase
and accumulations to her children, share and share alike,.
and to execute a will so providing was not within the
statute of frauds as an agreement not to be performed within
a year.
TRESPASS.

In Hadwell v. Righton, (1907) 2 K. B. 345 it appeared
that the plaintiff was riding a bicycle on a highway upon the
footpath of which were some fowls belonging
Damages:
Remoteness
to the defendant. As the plaintiff got abreast
of the fowls a dog belonging to a third person frightened
the fowls, one of which flew into the spokes of the machine,
causing it to upset, whereby the plaintiff suffered personal
injury and the bicycle was damaged. Under these circumstances the Court of King's Bench holds that even if the
fowl was not lawfully on the highway the circumstances
under which the accident happened prevented the damage
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TRESPASS (Continued).

from being the natural consequences of its presence there,
and that the plaintiff could not recover. It is queried by the
Court whether the occupiers of land adjoining the highway
are not entitled to allow their poultry to stray about the
highway.
TRIAL.

The Coiirt *of Appeals of Georgia decides in E. Van
Winkle &c. Works v. Pittinan et al., 58 S. E. 379 that the
right to open and conclude in a jury trial is of
Right to
Open
great importance; and the plaintiff should not
Close and
be deprived of this right, unless the defendant,
in his pleadings, before the introduction of any testimony
by the plaintiff, admits facts authorizing, without further
proof, a verdict in the plaintiff's favor for the full amount
claimed in the declaration. CompareBuchanan v. McDonald, 40 Ga., 288.
USURY.

The Supreme Court of Washington decides in Grubb v.
Stewart, et al., 91 Pac. 562 that where defendants were not
creditors nor in privity with an investment comPersons
Entitled to
pany which was complainant's debtor under a
Plead
contract on which complainant's claim was based,
they could not avail themselves of the defense that the
contract sued on was usurious; such defense being personal
to the debtor and his privies. Compare Lamoille County
Nat. Bank v. Binghamn, 50 Vt. 105.
WILLS.

An interesting situation is disclosed in Wagstaff v. Ialland, (1907) 2 Ch. 35 where it appeared that a testator gave
all his furniture and household goods and effects
at his two residences to his "dear wife Dorothy

Josephine Wagstaff," and, after giving various pecuniary
legacies, he devised and bequeathed the residue of his real
and personal estate to his said wife and two others upon
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trust for sale and conversion, and to invest and pay the
interest and annual produce thereof to "my said wife during
her life, if she shall so long continue my widow, for her
own use and benefit and upon or after her decease or second marriage" to stand possessed of the residuary trust
estate in the events which had happened, upon trust for the
plaintiff. The lady whom the testator called his wife, and
with' whom he went through the ceremony of marriage in
1893, was at that time the wife of one X., to whom she
had been married in 1884, and who was still living.
After the testator's death in 1903 the lady confessed to
bigamy and was sentenced. The plaintiff claimed to be
now entitled to the whole residuary estate. Under these
decisions the English Chancery Court holds that the testator
meant to use the word "widow" in a secondary sense, and
upon the true construction of the will the lady was entitled
to a life interest in the residuary estate, unless and until
she contracted a marriage subsequent to the death of the
testator. See in this connection Jones' Estate, 211 Pa. 364.
WITNESSES.
The Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia holds
in Kirchner v. Smith et al. that an attorney employed by
two or more persons to give professional advice
Evidence of
or assistance in a matter in which they are
Attorney
mutually interested can, on litigation subsequently arising between such persons or their representatives, be examined as a witness, at the instance of either,
as to communications made when he was acting as attorney
for all, although he could not discuss such communication in
a controversy between his clients, or either of them, and
third persons. Compare Sparks v. Sparks, 51 Kans. 195.
In State v. Harrison, 58 S. E., 754 the Supreme Court of
North Carolina decides that a witness may be allowed to
use a map to explain his testimony though the
Use of
Diagrams

map is not admitted in evidence.

